We describe a general technique for determining upper bounds on maximal values (or lower bounds on minimal costs) in stochastic dynamic programs. In this approach, we relax the nonanticipativity constraints that require decisions to depend only on the information available at the time a decision is made and impose a "penalty" that punishes violations of nonanticipativity. In applications, the hope is that this relaxed version of the problem will be simpler to solve than the original dynamic program. The upper bounds provided by this dual approach complement lower bounds on values that may be found by simulating with heuristic policies. We describe the theory underlying this dual approach and establish weak duality, strong duality and complementary slackness results that are analogous to the duality results of linear programming. We also study properties of good penalties. Finally, we demonstrate the use of this dual approach in an adaptive inventory control problem with an unknown and changing demand distribution and in valuing options with stochastic volatilities and interest rates. These are complex problems of significant practical interest that are quite difficult to solve to optimality. In these examples, our dual approach requires relatively little additional computation and leads to tight bounds on the optimal values.
Introduction
In principle, dynamic programming provides a powerful framework for determining optimal policies in complex decision problems where uncertainty is resolved and decisions are made over time. However, the widespread use of dynamic programming is hampered by the so-called "curse of dimensionality" -the size of the state space typically grows exponentially in the number of state variables considered. In contrast, Monte Carlo simulation methods typically scale well with the number of state variables considered and, given a control policy, it is not difficult to simulate a complex dynamic system with many uncertainties. Simulating with a feasible policy provides a lower bound on the expected value (or upper bound on the expected costs) of an optimal policy, but Monte Carlo simulation typically does not provide a good way to identify an optimal policy or provide an upper bound on the value of an optimal policy.
In this paper, we describe a dual approach for studying stochastic dynamic programs (DPs) that focuses on providing an upper bound on the optimal expected value. This dual approach consists of two elements: (1) we relax the nonanticipativity constraints that require decisions to depend only on the information available at the time a decision is made and (2) we impose a penalty that punishes violations of the nonanticipativity constraints. By relaxing the nonanticipativity constraints, we can often greatly simplify the DP. For example, we study an adaptive inventory control problem with an unknown and changing demand distribution and stochastic ordering costs. Here a "perfect information relaxation" assumes the decision maker (DM) knows all demands and costs before placing any orders. With this information, the problem of choosing an optimal ordering schedule is a deterministic DP that can be solved quite easily. In another example, we study an option pricing model with stochastic volatilities and stochastic interest rates and consider an "imperfect information relaxation" where volatilities and interest rates are known in advance but the stock price is not:
with the volatilities and interest rates known, we can value the option using standard lattice methods.
Because these relaxations assume the DM has more information than is truly available, they lead to an upper bound on value. Without any penalty for using this additional information, the bound obtained is often quite weak. Informally, we say a penalty is dual feasible if it does not penalize any policy that is nonanticipative; the penalties may, however, punish policies that do not satisfy the nonanticipativity constraints. We will show that in principle we can always find a dual feasible penalty that provides a tight bound, i.e., strong duality holds.
We view this dual approach as a complement to the use of simulation methods and modern approximate dynamic programming methods for studying DPs (see, e.g., Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996) , de Farias and Van Roy (2003) , Powell (2007) , or Adelman and Mersererau (2008) ). As mentioned earlier, given a candidate policy (perhaps identified using a heuristic approach or using approximate DP techniques), we can use standard simulation techniques to estimate the expected value with this policy and thereby generate a lower bound on the expected value with an optimal policy. Our dual approach can then be used to generate an upper bound on the value of an optimal policy. If the difference between the expected value with this candidate policy and the upper bound on the optimal value is small, we may conclude that the candidate policy is "good enough" and not continue searching for a better policy. If the difference is large, it may be worthwhile to work harder to find a better policy and/or a tighter upper bound. In our inventory example, we will use the dual bounds to determine whether a simple myopic ordering policy is "good enough" or whether we need to consider more complex one-or two-period look-ahead policies. In the option pricing example, we use the dual bounds to study the effectiveness of an exercise policy that ignores uncertainty about volatilities and interest rates. In both examples, we will also demonstrate how we can use the results of the dual problem to identify ways to improve these heuristic policies.
Our interest in this dual approach for DPs was motivated by the need to evaluate the quality of heuristic approximate value functions and demonstrate the use of this method in high-dimensional option pricing problems. Andersen and Broadie (2004) propose an alternative method for generating dual martingales based on approximate policies. Glasserman (2004) provides a nice overview of this work.
We generalize the work of Haugh and Kogan, Rogers, and Andersen and Broadie in several ways. First, rather than focusing exclusively on option pricing problems, we consider general stochastic DPs. Second, rather than focusing exclusively on perfect information relaxations, we consider general information relaxations. Finally, we present a general method for constructing good penalties that includes and extends the methods proposed by Haugh and Kogan and Andersen and Broadie. These generalizations expand the scope and flexibility of this dual approach.
The idea of relaxing the nonanticipativity constraints has also been studied in the stochastic programming literature (see, e.g., Rockafellar and Wets (1991), Shapiro and Ruszczyński (2003, 2007) ). Rogers (2007) also recently (independently) proposed a dual approach for Markov decision processes. In short, though these alternative approaches have similarities with ours, our formulation is different and leads to results that we believe are both simpler and more general. The stochastic programming formulation requires the reward functions and set of feasible actions to be convex and the penalties considered are linear functions of the actions; they consider only perfect information relaxations. Rogers focuses on Markov decision processes and considers only perfect information relaxations and penalties that are a function of the state variable only;
Rogers does not present any example applications. In contrast, our framework allows general reward functions and action spaces, allows general penalty functions, and considers imperfect as well as perfect information relaxations. Moreover, our duality proofs are quite simple and direct and do not rely on sophisticated convex duality or martingale arguments. Finally, our inventory control and option pricing examples demonstrate the power of this dual approach in some complex problems of significant practical interest.
We begin in §2 by defining the basic framework and theory underlying the dual approach; the main results are analogous to the duality results of linear programming. We then illustrate the approach in the inventory control and option pricing examples in §3-4. We offer a few concluding remarks in §5. The online appendices provide supporting information: Appendix A contains most of the proofs; Appendix B compares our results to similar results in stochastic programming and develops the connections to linear programming more fully; and Appendix C provides some details of the adaptive inventory example.
The Basic Framework and Results
We begin by describing the general formulation of the primal stochastic DP in §2. 1 . We then present our main duality results in §2.2 and discuss an approach for generating good penalties in §2.3.
General Framework
Uncertainty in the DP is described by a probability space (Ω, F, P) where Ω is the set of possible outcomes (with typical element ω), F is a σ-algebra that describes the set of all possible events (an event is a subset of Ω), and P is a probability measure describing the likelihoods of the various events.
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, . . . , T . The DM's state of information evolves over time and is described by a filtration F = (F 0 , . . . , F T ) where the σ-algebra F t describes the DM's state of information at the beginning of period t, i.e., F t is the set of events that will be known to be true or false at time t.
We will refer to F as the natural filtration. We require all filtrations to satisfy F t ⊆ F t+1 ⊆ F for all t < T so the DM does not forget what she once knew. We will assume that F 0 = {∅, Ω}, so the DM initially "knows nothing" about the outcome of the uncertainties. A function (or random variable) f defined on Ω is measurable with respect to a σ-algebra F t (or F t -measurable) if for every Borel set R in the range of f , we have {ω : f (ω) ∈ R} ∈ F t ; we can interpret f being F t -measurable as meaning the result of f depends only on the information known in period t. A sequence of functions (f 0 , . . . , f T ) is said to be adapted to a filtration F (or F-adapted) if each function f t is measurable with respect to F t .
In the DP model, the DM will choose an action a t in period t from the set A t ; we let A ⊆ A 0 × · · · × A T denote the set of all feasible action sequences a. The DM's choice of actions is described by a policy α that selects a sequence of actions a in A for each outcome ω in Ω (i.e., α : Ω → A). We let A denote the set of all policies. In the primal DP, we assume that the DM's choices are nonanticipative in that the choice of action a t in period t depends only on what is known at the beginning of period t. More formally, we require policies to be adapted to the natural filtration F in that a policy's selection of the first t+1 actions (a 0 , . . . , a t ) must be measurable with respect to F t . We let A F be the set of all nonanticipative policies.
1
The goal of the DP is to select a nonanticipative policy α to maximize the expected total reward. The rewards are defined by a sequence of reward functions (r 0 (a, ω) , . . . , r 0 (a, ω)) where the reward in period t depends on the action sequence a selected and the outcome ω. We let r(a, ω) = T t=0 r t (a, ω) denote the total reward; discounting can be incorporated into the period reward function r t . The primal DP is then:
Here E [r(α)] could be written more explicitly as E [r(α(ω), ω)] where policy α selects an action sequence that depends on the random outcome ω and the rewards r depend on the action sequence selected by α and the outcome ω. We will typically suppress the dependence on ω and interpret r(α) as a random variable representing the reward generated with policy α.
It is instructive to write the primal DP (1) 
Here both sides are random variables (and therefore implicitly functions of the outcome ω) and we select an optimal action a t for each outcome ω. Since the rewards r t are assumed to be F t -measurable and the expected continuation values are conditioned on F t and thus F t -measurable, the objective function on the right is F t -measurable for each set of actions (a 0 , . . . , a t ). Thus, the supremum over actions a t is also F tmeasurable, which implies that V t is F t -measurable. There is no loss in restricting the choice of actions a t to be F t -measurable; so, if the suprema on the right side of (2) are attained, we can construct a nonanticipative optimal policy using this recursion. The final value V 0 is equal to the optimal value of (1).
The Dual Approach
In our dual approach to the DP (1), we relax the requirement that the policies be nonanticipative and impose penalties that punish violations of the nonanticipativity constraints. We define relaxations of the nonanticipativity requirement by considering alternative information structures. We say that a filtration
abbreviate this by writing F ⊆ G. G being a relaxation of F means that the DM knows more in every period under G than she knows under F. The perfect information filtration I = (I 0 , . . . , I T ) is given by taking
We let A G denote the set of policies that are adapted to G. For any relaxation G of F, we have A F ⊆ A G ⊆ A I = A; thus, as we relax the filtration, we expand the set of feasible policies.
The set of penalties Z is the set of all functions z(a, ω) that, like the total rewards, depend on the choice of action sequence a and the outcome ω. As with rewards, we will typically write the penalties as an action-
suppressing the dependence on the outcome ω. We define the set Z F of dual feasible penalties to be those penalties that do not penalize nonanticipative policies (in expectation), that is
Policies that do not satisfy the nonanticipativity constraints (and thus are not feasible to implement) may have positive expected penalties.
We can place an upper bound on the expected reward associated with any nonanticipative policy by relaxing the nonanticipativity constraint on policies and imposing a dual feasible penalty. This simple result can be viewed as a version of the "weak duality lemma" for linear programming: 
Proof. With z, α F , and G as defined in the lemma, we have
The first inequality holds because z ∈ Z F (thus E [z(α F )] ≤ 0) and the second because α F ∈ A F ⊆ A G .
Thus any information relaxation with any dual feasible penalty will provide an upper bound on all DP solutions. With a fixed penalty z, weaker relaxations G lead to larger sets of feasible policies A G and weaker bounds. For example, if we consider the perfect information relaxation I, the set of relaxed policies A I is simply the set of all policies A and all actions are selected with full knowledge of the outcome. Thus, the weak duality lemma implies that for any α F in A F and z in Z F ,
If we take the penalty z = 0, this upper bound is the expected value with perfect information.
Note that the upper bound (5) is in a form that is convenient for Monte Carlo simulation: we can estimate the expected value on the right side of (5) by randomly generating outcomes ω and solving a deterministic "inner problem" of choosing an action sequence a to maximize the penalized objective r(a, ω) − z(a, ω) for each ω. For instance in our inventory example, the perfect information relaxation assumes the DM has knowledge of all demands and costs before making any ordering decisions. We estimate the dual bound by randomly generating demand/cost scenarios in the "outer simulation" and the inner problem is a simple deterministic DP that chooses optimal ordering quantities in each demand/cost scenario. With relaxations that provide less than perfect information, we can often still use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the upper bounds. For instance in our option pricing example, we will randomly generate interest rates and volatilities in the outer simulation and the inner problem is a one-dimensional DP that considers uncertainty in stock prices.
If we minimize over the dual feasible penalties in (4), we obtain the dual of the primal DP (1):
By the weak duality lemma, if we identify a policy α F and penalty z that are primal and dual feasible, respectively, such that equality holds in (4), then α F and z must be optimal for their respective problems.
In such a case, there would be no gap between the values given by these primal and dual solutions. If the primal solution is bounded, there is always a dual feasible penalty that yields no gap. For example, consider the penalty z * (a) = r(a) − v * where v * is the optimal value of the primal DP (1). This z * is dual feasible
) and trivially optimal: no matter what policy is selected, the penalized objective function r(a) − z * (a) is equal to v * . The existence of this trivially optimal penalty is not helpful in practice because it requires knowing the optimal value v * of the primal DP. It does, however, show that there is no gap between the solutions to the primal and dual problems and that, in principle, we could determine the maximal expected reward in the primal DP (1) by solving the dual problem (6). This result is analogous to the strong duality theorem of linear programming.
Furthermore, if the primal problem on the left is bounded, the dual problem on the right has an optimal solution z * ∈ Z F that achieves this bound.
The "complementary slackness condition" further characterizes the relationship between the primal and dual problems, saying that for a primal-dual pair (α * F , z * ) to be optimal, it is necessary and sufficient for α * F to have zero expected penalty and for α * F to "solve" the dual problem in the following sense. 
Equation (8) can be interpreted as implying that with an optimal penalty, in the dual problem the DM will be content to choose a policy that is nonanticipative even though she has the option of choosing a policy that is not. In applications, we will compare the heuristic policies α F used to compute a lower bound with the policies α G selected in the dual problem to see if we can identify some way to improve the heuristic policy.
Finally, we note a useful property of this dual approach: if we can simplify the primal problem by focusing on some subset of policies, we can restrict the dual problem to focus on policies in this same set.
For example, if we know the optimal policy for the primal problem is myopic or has a threshold structure, we can simplify the the dual problem by considering only policies that have the same structure. This leads to dual bounds that are at least as tight and perhaps easier to compute than the dual bounds that do not include this constraint. We summarize this property as follows. 
for any dual feasible z, we have
Moreover, the inequalities also hold for all z such that
For instance in our option pricing example, in the primal problem it is never optimal to exercise a call option prior to expiration, except possibly just before a dividend is paid. However, in the dual problem with a relaxed filtration, "early exercise" may be optimal. In our numerical experiments for this example, we will use this structural result and impose a "no early exercise" constraint in the dual problem for call options.
The resulting bounds are both tighter and easier to compute than they would be without this constraint.
Good Penalties
In our discussion so far, we have considered the set of all dual feasible penalties. We now focus on identifying "good" penalties that are likely to be useful in practice. The main approach we will use to generate penalties is described in the following proposition. We will show shortly that we can, in principle, generate an optimal dual penalty using this approach, so that strong duality holds even when restricted to these "good" penalties. Property (i) of the proposition implies that the penalties z generated using the proposition will always be
, but is stronger in that it implies the inequality defining feasibility holds with equality. The complementary slackness condition (Theorem 2.2) shows that an optimal penalty z * will assign zero expected penalty to an optimal primal policy α * . Penalties generated using Proposition 2.2 will assign zero expected penalty to all nonanticipative policies.
Property (ii) of the proposition implies that the penalized objective function can be decomposed into period-t components r t − z t that depend only on what is known at period t under G and the actions chosen in or before period t. This means we can solve the dual problem using a DP recursion like that of equation (2) using the penalized rewards and based on filtration G rather than F. Specifically, the terminal dual value
. . , a T ) = 0 and, for t = 0, . . . , T , we have
The initial value, V G 0 , provides on upper bound on the primal DP (1) or, equivalently, (2). We can construct an optimal penalty using Proposition 2.2 by taking the generating functions to be based on the optimal DP value function given by (2) . Specifically, if we take w t (a) = V t+1 (a 0 , . . . , a t ), we arrive at an optimal dual penalty z (a) that we will refer to as the "ideal" penalty. It is easy to show by induction that with this choice of generating function, the dual value functions are equal to the corresponding primal value functions, i.e., V G t = V t . This is trivially true for the terminal values (both are zero). If we assume that V G t+1 = V t+1 , terms cancel and (10) reduces to the expression for V t given in equation (2) . Thus, with this choice of generating function, we obtain an optimal penalty for any information relaxation G. The following theorem summarizes this result and adds a bit more. 
Although the value functions will not be known in applications, the form of z illustrates the ideal that we would like to approximate with our choice of penalties. Intuitively, we would like to choose penalties that eliminate the benefit of choosing actions based on the information in G rather than relying on the information in the natural filtration F. That is, we want to choose a generating function w t so the differences 
Andersen and Broadie generate sample paths in the outer simulation and estimate the conditional expectations using nested simulation. Whereas the nested simulations in the Haugh-Kogan approach consider a single period, here each period's nested simulation follows the specified policy through the end of the horizon or until the policy calls for stopping. Since each future period is considered in each nested simulation, the work involved in the Andersen-Broadie approach potentially grows with T 2 where T is the number of periods considered in the model. Again, these penalties will lead to valid bounds as long as the estimates of these conditional expectations are unbiased.
In practice, there will typically be a tradeoff between the quality of the bound and the computational effort required to compute it. We can control this tradeoff through our choice of information relaxation and penalty. The following proposition provides some properties of penalties and information relaxations that are useful in understanding these tradeoffs. 
(ii) For any two dual feasible penalties z 1 and z 2 and information relaxation G, we have
≤ sup 
The first result of the proposition says that if we generate penalties with a common set of generating functions, looser relaxations lead to weaker bounds. For example, we may find the bounds given by using a simple generating function (say, w t = 0) may be "good enough" with one information relaxation, but not "good enough" with a looser relaxation.
The second result of the proposition can be viewed as a continuity property: if the penalties z 1 and z
is small for all α G , then the bounds provided by the two penalties will also be close. For example, if z 2 is the ideal penalty z and therefore yields the optimal upper bound, the bound given by some other penalty z 1 will exceed the optimal bound by no more than
In this sense, penalties that are close to the ideal penalty will lead to bounds that are close to optimal.
The third result can be helpful for determining penalties when E [w t (a)|F t ] is difficult to calculate.
For instance in the option pricing example, if we assume that under the natural filtration F volatility is unobserved, we may be able to simplify the computation of bounds by calculating penalties using a filtration for the option example in §4.7 confirm this finding.
Summary of Approach
Before turning to our examples, it may be worthwhile to summarize the steps involved in our approach.
Given a dynamic programming model:
• Identify a heuristic policy that can be used in a simulation study to estimate a lower bound on the optimal value (or upper bound on the optimal cost) for the problem.
• Choose an information relaxation that makes it "easy" to determine optimal decisions given the additional information in the relaxation. It is often natural to start by considering a perfect information relaxation, though in some problems there may be other natural starting points.
• Find a penalty that does not greatly complicate the calculation of optimal decisions with the chosen information relaxation. We can start with zero penalty, but this often leads to weak upper bounds.
• Estimate lower and upper bounds on the optimal value. In our examples, we will typically estimate the upper and lower bounds simultaneously in a single simulation.
• If the gap between bounds is sufficiently small, we may conclude that the heuristic policy is "good enough" for use in practice and we are done. If not, we can study the differences between the heuristic policies and the dual policies and see if these suggest some ideas for improving the heuristic policies, relaxations or penalties.
In the next two sections, we will study two complex examples and discuss issues involved in choosing heuristic policies, information relaxations and penalties in these applications.
Example: Adaptive Inventory Control
Our first example is an adaptive inventory control model where demand is nonstationary and partially observed, meaning the probability distribution for demand changes over time and the true demand distribution is not known. These kinds of models are of significant practical interest, but are quite difficult to solve.
Treharne and Sox (2002) consider several different heuristic policies and evaluate the performance of these policies in a set of 5-period examples that they were able to solve exactly. We illustrate our dual bounding approach by evaluating these heuristic policies in larger versions of Treharne and Sox's examples.
The Model
The goal is to find a policy for ordering goods over T periods (t = 0, . . . , T − 1) to minimize the expected total costs. The inventory level at the beginning of period t is denoted by x t and the amount ordered in period t is a t . The demand in period t is uncertain and denoted by d t . The inventory level evolves according
) where x 0 is the initial inventory level. This evolution equation assumes unmet demand is backordered and appears as a negative inventory level entering the next period; the equation also assumes there is no lead time required to fulfill the orders. The order quantities and demands are assumed to be nonnegative integers.
The period-t demand d t is drawn from a distribution δ t that changes stochastically, following a Markov process. The demand d t is observed at the end of period t, but the distribution δ t is never observed. We begin with a prior distribution π 0 on the initial demand distribution δ 0 and update this over time with the period-(t+1) distribution π t+1 (π t , d t ) taking into account the prior beliefs π t , the observed demand d t and the possibility of the distribution δ t changing.
In each period, there are ordering costs as well as costs associated with holding inventory or failing to meet demand. The cost of ordering a t units is c t a t , where c t is the cost of ordering one item or unit. The cost of holding inventory
where h t is the per unit cost of holding excess inventory in period t and p t is the per unit penalty associated with backordering unmet demand in period t. Treharne and Sox assume a terminal cost of −c T x T to capture the value (or cost) of holding inventory (or unmet demand) at the end of the planning horizon. We generalize Treharne and Sox's model by allowing the ordering costs c t to vary following a Markov chain that is independent of the demands d t and demand distributions δ t ; we assume that the period-t ordering cost c t is known at the beginning of period t. This generalization will allow us to consider a broader range of information relaxations and makes the problem harder to solve.
Placing this model in the general framework of §2.1, the actions a 0 , . . . , a T −1 are the order quantities for each period and the action sequences a are drawn from the set A of T -vectors of nonnegative integers. An outcome ω is a sample path that includes the demands, demand distributions and ordering costs for each period and a terminal cost c T ; that is, the outcomes are of the form ω = (
The natural filtration F corresponds to knowing the demands (d 0 , . . . , d t−1 ) and costs (c 0 , . . . , c t ) at the beginning of period t. Since the goal here is to minimize costs, we can either rewrite the primal DP (1) as a minimization problem or else take the rewards in (1) to be the negative costs.
The structure of the adaptive inventory model is perhaps clearer if we view the problem as a partially observable Markov decision process and write it recursively. The period-t state variable is (x t , c t , π t ) where x t is the inventory level at the beginning of period t, c t is the ordering cost in period t, and π t is the probability distribution on the period-t demand distribution δ t . In this recursive formulation, it is convenient to take the decision variables to be the order-up-to-level y t = x t + a t rather than the order quantity a t . We can then write the period-t cost-to-go function J t , for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, as
Hered t andc t+1 denote the random period-t demand and period-(t+1) costs and the terminal cost function
What makes this problem difficult to solve is that each demand sequence (d 0 , . . . , d t−1 ) leads to a different π t and, consequently, the number of scenarios that must be considered grows exponentially in the number of periods considered. For instance, the problems that Treharne and Sox solved to optimality had 5 time periods, 19 possible demand levels, and one ordering cost level. To find an optimal policy, they had to solve the optimization problem (15) for approximately 138,000 different (c t , π t )-scenarios. In our numerical examples, we will consider 10 time periods, 19 demand levels, and 3 cost levels; we would have to solve approximately 10 12 such optimization problems to find an optimal policy.
Heuristic Policies
Because of the complexity of the primal problem, Treharne and Sox propose using simpler "limited-lookahead policies" that choose an order quantity that is optimal for a truncated version of the model that looks only zero, one or two periods into the future.
In the terminal cases with
When simulating the inventory system using an L-period look-ahead policy, we determine the order quantity for a particular (c t , π t )-scenario by solving (16) for the optimal order-up-to level y t . We then draw the random demand d t and next period cost c t+1 , calculate the updated probability distribution π t+1 , and repeat the process by finding the order quantity for the next period using the L-period look-ahead value function starting at (c t+1 , π t+1 ).
The complexity of these limited-look-ahead policies grows exponentially with the look-ahead horizon L.
In our numerical examples, we take L = 0, 1, and 2 and we must solve 1, 58, and 1141 scenario-specific optimization problems (respectively) to determine the recommended order quantity for each period. If we estimate the expected costs of these policies using a simulation with T periods and K trials, we must solve KT , 58KT or 1141KT optimization problems for the 0-, 1-, and 2-period look-ahead policies, respectively.
Information Relaxations
We will study three different information relaxations in this example, each of which allows us to avoid considering the full tree of all possible cost/demand scenarios. First, we will consider the perfect information relaxation. In this case, in the outer simulation we randomly generate the full sequence of ordering costs (c 0 , . . . , c T ), demand distributions (δ 0 , . . . , δ T −1 ), and actual demands (d 0 , . . . , d T −1 ). In the inner problem, we determine optimal order quantities by solving a simple deterministic DP. With this relaxation, we will be selecting random samples from the large tree of possible cost/demand scenarios.
Second, we will consider a tighter, imperfect information relaxation that assumes the demand distributions (δ 0 , . . . , δ T −1 ) and actual demands (d 0 , . . . , d T −1 ) are known in advance but assumes the ordering costs c t are not known until period t. In this case, we randomly generate the demand distributions and demands in the outer simulation. In the inner problem, we solve a small stochastic DP that determines cost-dependent order quantities for each period.
The third relaxation is tighter than the first two: it assumes the actual costs c t and demands d t are revealed as in the natural filtration (in period t and period t+1, respectively) but the demand distribution δ t is known in period t; the natural filtration assumes δ t is never observed. In this case, if we assume zero penalty, the dual problem can be formulated as a Markov DP with state variable (x t , c t , δ t ); the number of scenarios that must be considered no longer grows exponentially in T and this DP is easy to solve.
Penalties
As discussed in §2.3, the ideal penalty takes the generating function w t to be the optimal continuation value, i.e., the period-(t+1) value function V t+1 . Here we will take the generating function w L t for the "L-period look-ahead penalty" to be the the L-period look-ahead cost-to-go functions defined by equation (16),
For example in the myopic case with L = 0, the generating function is simply −c t+1 (y t − d t ). Although we would not expect the (L-1)-period look-ahead cost-to-go functions to provide a very good approximation of the actual cost-go-functions functions J t+1 (they consider the costs over a small fraction of the total time frame), these limited-look-ahead cost functions may provide a reasonable approximation of the change in costs due to having the additional information provided by relaxation G over the natural filtration F.
In the perfect information relaxation, the full sequence of demands and costs are known in advance and generated in the outer simulation.
denote the sequences of these values generated in the kth trial of the simulation and letπ k t denote the period-t probability distribution on δ t given by starting with the prior distribution π 0 and updating based on seeing (d (16)). Consequently, when are using simulation to estimate the expected costs with an L-period look-ahead policy, it is not difficult to simultaneously estimate the corresponding dual bound: we need only solve one additional scenario-specific optimization problem for each period.
The dual bounds are also easy to calculate with the generating function of equation (17) for the imperfect information relaxation that assumes the demands (d 0 , . . . , d T −1 ) and demand distributions (δ 0 , . . . , δ T −1 ) are known in advance, but the ordering costs c t are revealed over time as in the natural filtration. In this case, the inner problem is a stochastic DP that explicitly considers the uncertainty about the ordering costs; see Appendix A.7 for details. By Proposition 2.2(i), we know that the bounds given by using this imperfect information relaxation will be at least as good as those given by the perfect information relaxation.
The third information relaxation we consider in this problem assumes the demand distributions δ t are observed in period t, but c t and d t are revealed over time as in the natural filtration. As discussed in §3.3, with zero penalty, this dual problem can be formulated as a Markov decision problem that is not difficult to solve. However, with this relaxation, the generating function of equation (17) leads to an inner problem that is not easy to solve. The difficulty is that the generating functions depend on the probability distributions π t+1 which, in turn, depend on the whole history of demands (d 0 , . . . , d t ). This dependence destroys the Markovian structure that makes it easy to solve the inner problem with no penalty. Thus, the generating function (17) works well with the first two relaxations, but not with the the third.
Numerical Results
In this section, we describe numerical results for the adaptive inventory control example. Our choice of parameters closely follows Treharne and Sox (2002). Specifically, following Treharne and Sox, we assume that there are three possible random demand distributions δ t , each of which is a truncated negative binomial distribution that ranges from 0 to 18 units. The three distributions are "low," "medium," and "high" and have means and standard deviations of (1, 1.01), (9, 3.01) and (16, 4.01), respectively, before truncation. We consider 7 different transition probability matrices representing various trends for the demand distributions.
The holding costs h t are set to $1.00 per unit and the backorder costs p t are $1.00, $1.86, or $4.00 per unit. Finally, we consider 4 different priors on the initial demand distribution δ 0 : the first, third and fourth represent cases where the demands are most likely to be high, medium or low, respectively; the second prior is a uniform distribution across the three different demand distributions. In total, there are 84 different combinations of parameters to consider (7 transition matrices × 3 backorder costs × 4 priors). In each case, we assume the initial ordering costs c 0 are $0.60 per unit and later costs take values $0.00, $0.60, or $1.20 following a Markov chain. (These assumptions are described in detail in Appendix C.) Finally, we take the planning horizon T to be 10 periods and assume zero initial inventory.
In our numerical experiments, we calculate upper and lower bounds on the optimal expected costs using the zero-, one-or two-step look-ahead policies and penalties. For each combination of model parameters, we estimate the bounds using a simulation of 1000 trials. In most cases, the gaps between bounds narrow as we increase the look-ahead horizon, albeit at varying rates. In many cases, the bounds are all quite narrow and the fish look like minnows; in these cases, we could probably assume that the myopic policies are "good enough" and not consider more complex policies.
2
In the cases with a "stable transition matrix, with positive correlation" (on the left of the figure), the fish have relatively wide tails on the left, but narrow quickly: here we may not be satisfied with the quality of the myopic policy, but may find the one-or two-period look-ahead policies to be "good enough." There are,
however, a few cases -with "downward, slow" and "downward, fast" transitions (on the right side of the figure) -where the gaps remain relatively large even with a two-period look-ahead policy. We will return to these cases in §3.6 below. The run times required to calculate these bounds are shown in Table 1 . We show the time required to evaluate the zero-, one-or two-period-look-ahead heuristic policies using 1000 trials for one set of model parameters and the additional time required to calculate the dual bounds with these same 1000 trials. 3 Here we see that, once we have calculated the bounds associated with the heuristic policies (and the associated look-ahead value functions), it takes little additional time to compute the dual bounds. The myopic dual bounds are somewhat faster to compute than the one-and two-period look-ahead bounds because in the myopic case we know the objective function in equation (18) is convex and can simplify the optimization problem. The imperfect information bounds take somewhat longer to compute than the perfect information bounds, because we must solve for dual optimal actions in each of the three possible cost states in each period rather than the one randomly chosen cost state that is considered in the perfect information case.
As discussed in Section §3.3, we can construct an alternative lower bound on expected costs by considering Figure 1 . These lines are well below the "fish" representing the limited-lookahead bounds. Thus, in these examples, observing the demand distribution is quite valuable and, with no penalty, the corresponding bounds are quite weak.
Improving the Heuristic Policies and Bounds
We now consider the use of the dual results to identify better policies and bounds when the gaps are relatively large. We will focus on the cases with the "downward, slow" and "downward, fast" transition matrices. In these cases, demand may initially be high (with mean 16), but it may drop to medium (with mean 9) or low (with mean 1) this period and, when demand drops, it will not increase again. Comparing the order-up-to quantities (the y t s) selected by the myopic policy with those selected in the corresponding dual bound, we find that the dual problem takes advantage of the perfect information to reduce the order in the period when demand drops to the low demand state, thereby avoiding the cost of carrying excess inventory when the system enters the low state. It appears that the myopic policies order too much when the system is not in the low demand state and the dual penalties do not appropriately "punish" the DM in the dual problem for taking advantage of the perfect information about demand.
To understand why this is the case, note that the terminal value used in determining myopic policies and used as the generating function for the myopic dual bound, J −1 t (x t ; c t , π t ) = −c t x t , implicitly assumes that leftover inventory substitutes for future purchases. One way to perhaps improve the policies and bounds is to use the terminal values based on a model that assumes the demand distributions is observable. Specifically, we take the limited-look-ahead terminal value J −1 t (x t ; c t , π t ) to be E J o t (x t , c t ,δ t )|π t where J o t is the value function for a Markov DP that assumes the demand distribution δ t is observed in each period; this model was used to calculate the "observable demand distribution" bounds described in §3.5. As is evident in Figure   1 , these observable demand value functions are not very good approximations of the true value functions (they greatly underestimate costs), but they are easy to compute and, unlike the original terminal values, they include the holding costs associated with having excess inventory in a low demand state.
This modification leads to dramatic improvements for the cases with the "downward, slow" and "downward, fast" transition matrices, with little additional work. For example in the case with the "downward, slow" transition matrix, high backorder costs and a high prior distribution, the myopic bounds with the modified terminal values were $107.0 and $107.5 as compared to $92 and $111 for the myopic bounds with the original terminal values; the run times were 7.7 and 7.4 seconds, respectively. (These results are for the perfect information relaxation and a simulation of 1000 trials.) The myopic bounds for the other cases with "downward, slow" and "downward, fast" transition matrices are also much improved. In these cases, these modified myopic policies not only outperform the original myopic policies, they also outperform the significantly more complex one-and two-period look-ahead policies based on the original terminal values.
(See Appendix C for detailed results for all cases.) Though this modification of the myopic policies greatly improves the results for the cases with the "downward, slow" and "downward, fast" transition matrices, the modified myopic policies perform worse than the original myopic policies in some other cases, where the original myopic policies performed quite well. In all, comparing across the 84 different sets of parameters, we find that we can get within 2% of the optimal costs (and typically closer) using one of these two myopic policies. Thus, by experimenting with the heuristic policies and comparing the expected costs and policies to the corresponding dual bounds and policies, we have identified simple heuristic policies that perform well in each of the 84 cases considered.
Moreover, we know that we cannot do much better with more complex policies.
Example: Option Pricing with Stochastic Volatilities and Interest Rates
An American call (put) option gives its owner the right to buy (sell) a stock at a specified strike price at any time before the option expires. To value an American option, we must use dynamic programming methods to determine an optimal policy for exercising the option. The original Black-Scholes-Merton model for valuing options on stocks assumes the volatility of the stock price and the (risk-free) interest rate are both constant over time. In this setting, we can value an American option by solving a one-dimensional DP, typically represented as a binomial or trinomial lattice. In this example, we will consider the problem of valuing American options on a dividend-paying stock with stochastic volatilities and interest rates.
The Model
We will consider fairly standard models of stock prices, volatilities, and interest rates and will not exploit any non-standard properties of these models in our analysis. Specifically, our model of stock prices and volatilities follows Heston (1993) and our model of interest rates follows Medvedev and Scaillet's (2007) extension of Heston's model. With no dividends, the stock price s τ at time τ has drift equal to the risk-free interest rate γ τ and instantaneous variance v τ (v τ is the square of the volatility); s τ , γ τ , and v τ evolve according to the joint stochastic process
whereγ andv are long-run average levels for γ τ and v τ (respectively); κ γ and κ v are the corresponding mean-reversion rates; and σ γ and σ v are the corresponding instantaneous volatilities. We will assume that the
Following standard practice in option valuation, we assume that the stochastic differential equations (19) are "risk-neutral" processes and the model parameters include any required risk premiums. With this assumption, the value of any security whose value depends on s τ is given as the expected present value of its future payoffs, where expectations are calculated using the risk-neutral processes and payoffs are discounted at the risk-free rate γ τ . This implies that between dividends the discounted stock price follows a martingale, i.e., the expected present value of the stock at time τ 2 , discounted back to τ 1 values at the prevailing interest rate, is equal to the current price s τ 1 .
This martingale property implies that there is no benefit to exercising a call option before expiration, except possibly immediately before a dividend is paid. Following Proposition 2.1, we will impose a constraint that enforces this "no early exercise" property when calculating bounds for call options. This "no early exercise" property does not hold for put options and we must consider all possible exercise dates.
To place this problem in our discrete-time framework of §2, we will consider a discrete-time approximation of the diffusions (19) where the time until expiration is divided into T steps of length δ. The outcomes ω are sample paths that specify the stock price, volatility, and interest rates at each step:
The actions a t are to exercise the option or not (i.e., a t ∈ {exercise, do not exercise}); the action space A includes the constraint that the option can be exercised at most once.
Let φ t = exp −δ ( t−1 i=0 γ t ) be a discount factor that converts the period-t option payoff back to period-0 values using the time-varying risk-free interest rates γ t . The period-t reward r t (a, ω) for an option with strike price K is then φ t (s t − K) for a call option (-φ t (s t − K) for a put) if a t = exercise and 0 otherwise.
The complexity of the primal DP depends on how we define the natural filtration F. The simplest formulation is to assume that the stock price, volatility and interest rates (s t , v t , γ t ) are observed in period t and that F t reflects knowledge of these processes up to time t. In this case, the primal DP can be formulated as a Markov decision process with three continuous state variables. In principle, this could be approximated using a three-dimensional grid to represent the state space. If we want good coverage of the state space, these grids may be quite large. For example, if we were to use a grid with 50 points for each dimension, we would need a total of 50 3 = 125, 000 elements to represent the state space and the probability transition matrix would have a total of (125, 000) 2 ≈ 1.6 × 10 10 elements. If we were to consider multi-factor models of interest rates and/or volatilities, these DPs would be even more complex.
Alternatively and perhaps more realistically, we might consider a natural filtration F that assumes stock prices and interest rates are observed in each period but recognizes the fact that the volatilities are never observed. The DP with this information structure could be formally modeled as a partially observed Markov decision problem with the state variable being (s t , γ t , π t ) where π t is a probability distribution on v t . Given the high dimensionality of π t , the corresponding primal DP would be very difficult to formulate and solve.
A Heuristic Policy
We can calculate a lower bound on the value of an option by simulating the option payoffs using any given exercise policy. We will generate lower bounds using an exercise policy that is optimal for a simplified model with constant volatilities and interest rates, set at their long run meansv andγ. This simplified option problem can be formulated as a DP with a one-dimensional state space and solved using standard lattice techniques. Our dual bounds will help us determine whether this simple exercise policy is "good enough" to value options in the more complex setting with stochastic volatilities and interest rates.
Information Relaxations
Our primary focus will be on an imperfect information relaxation that assumes the volatilities (v 0 , . . . , v T ) and interest rates (γ 0 , . . . , γ T ) are known in advance, but the stock price s t is not known until period t. Thus, in the outer simulation we generate volatilities and interest rates and the inner problem is a one-dimensional option pricing problem that can be solved using a simple lattice. Although the stock prices remain uncertain, the information about volatilities and interest rates may be valuable. For example, if the volatilities are correlated with stock price movements (i.e., ρ sv = 0), advance knowledge of the volatilities provides some information about future stock price movements. Even without such correlation, the volatilities affect the probability that an option will be "in the money" and hence may have some bearing on the option values and exercise decisions.
We will also consider a perfect information relaxation that assumes the volatilities (v 0 , . . . , v T ), interest rates (γ 0 , . . . , γ T ), and stock prices (s 0 , . . . , s T ) are known in advance and generated in the outer simulation.
In this case, the inner problem is a simple deterministic maximization problem where we choose the optimal exercise date or decline to exercise, with full knowledge of the penalized reward for exercising at each time.
Note that these relaxations both assume the volatilities are known in advance and thus provide valid bounds whether we assume that the volatility is truly observed in period t or not.
Penalties
We will focus on a simple penalty that approximately cancels the benefit of the information about stock prices provided by the information relaxation. As in the inventory example, our penalty will be derived from the model that is used to determine the heuristic policy. Here, the lower bound is given by simulating the complex model with stochastic volatilities and interest rates using a policy that is optimal for a simplified model with constant volatility and constant discount rates. In the simplified model, the "delta" for the option, ∆ t (s t ), describes the sensitivity of the period-t value of option to changes in the stock price s t in period t. These deltas are straightforward to compute in the lattice used to determine these heuristic policies and, because ∆ t (s t ) does not depend on the actual volatilities or interest rates, these deltas need only be calculated once when simulating to estimate the bounds.
We will use these deltas to approximate the impact of changing price expectations in our more complex model. Specifically, when the DM chooses to "wait" or hold the option (i.e., when a t = do not exercise and t < T ), we take the generating function of Proposition 2.2 for period t to be
where φ t is the previously defined discount factor that converts period-t values to period-0 values. The period-t penalty when the option is not exercised is then
The first two equalities follow from the definitions of z 
Note that if ρ sv = 0, then this expression simplifies and we have e −γ t δ E [s t+1 |G t ] = s t . Thus with no correlation between stock prices and volatilities, the penalty given by (21) is identically zero.
With this form of penalty, we can solve the resulting inner problems efficiently using a recursive DP formulation. The terminal value of a call option is given by v T +1 = 0 and
With the imperfect information relaxation, we will calculate bounds on the option value by randomly generating volatility and interest rates in the outer simulation and using a trinomial lattice to evaluate the recursion (23) in each scenario.
With the perfect information relaxation, stock prices are also generated in the outer simulation and we can rewrite the DP (23) for the inner problem as
where µ 0 = 0 and µ t = (2004) . There is, however, a subtle difference in our formulations of the dual optimization problem that we discuss in Appendix A.9.
Numerical Results
We will present numerical results for both put and call options, for a variety of model parameters. In all cases, we assume the options expire in one year (τ T = 1), the initial stock price s 0 is $100, and the stock pays dividends equal to 1% of the stock price at times τ = In all cases, we will calculate bounds in a simulation with 5000 trials. For the imperfect information bounds, we generate interest rates and volatilities in the outer simulation and, in each trial, we solve the inner problem (23) using a trinomial lattice with 101 stages. In this lattice, the stock prices are fixed but the probabilities are chosen to match the mean and variance of the stock price process in each period, given the volatility and interest rate information. For the put options, we allow exercise at each stage in the lattice. For the call options, as discussed in §4.1, we limit exercise to expiration and the periods just before a dividend is paid. To ensure consistency across the different bounds, we use this same lattice to value the options using the heuristic policy and to calculate the perfect information bounds. To calculate the perfect information bounds, we randomly select a stock price path from the lattice in each outer simulation trial.
The results are summarized in Table 2 ; Table 3 shows the time required to compute these bounds for one set of model parameters. In Table 2 we see that, as expected based on Proposition 2.3(i), the imperfect information bounds are tighter than the corresponding perfect information bounds with penalties constructed using the same generating function. Of course, the imperfect information bounds take somewhat longer to compute. Including the penalties improves the performance of all of the bounds, except with the imperfect information relaxation when the correlation ρ sv is zero: as discussed in §4.4, the penalties are identically zero in this case. The bounds with imperfect information and penalty are quite tight: the gap between the lower bound and this upper bound ranges from 0.2% to 0.8% of the value of the option. These gaps may be sufficiently small to conclude that the simple heuristic policy is good enough to use in practice. In addition, examining the mean standard errors (MSE) in the Table 2 , we see that the perfect information bounds are fairly precisely estimated.
Improving the Heuristic Policy
We can also use the results of the dual problem to improve the heuristic policy in this example. Specifically, let us focus on the case with the largest duality gap, the put option with strike price of $110 and a correlation If we let K be the number of trials in the outer simulation, N be the number of trials in each nested simulation, and T be the number of periods in the model, the Haugh-Kogan approach will require computational effort on the order of KN T ; each period requires a one-step nested simulation for each trial in the outer simulation. The nested simulations in Andersen-Broadie approach continue until the option is exercised or expires and the approach therefore requires computational effort proportional to KN T 2 . In our model we consider T = 100 periods, so we should expect the Andersen-Broadie approach to be quite time-consuming.
Indeed with K=5000 trials in the outer simulation and N =25 trials in each nested simulation, it took approximately 20,000 seconds (5.6 hours) to estimate the Andersen-Broadie bounds. It took approximately 270 seconds to estimate the Haugh-Kogan bounds with the same number of trials. With N =1000 trials in the inner simulation, these bounds take approximately 40 times longer to compute. Table 4 shows the estimated Haugh-Kogan and Andersen-Broadie bounds for the case of a put option with strike price of $110 with correlation ρ sv equal to −0.25, with varying number of trials (N ) in the nested simulation. All simulations involved K=5000 trials in the outer simulation, except the N =1000 case for the Andersen-Broadie bounds. The lower bound given by using the heuristic policy is approximately $13.42 in this case (or $13.48 with the improved policy discussed in §4.6). In these results, we see that sampling error in the nested simulations adversely affects the quality of the bounds, consistent with Proposition
2.3(iv)
. Although the Haugh-Kogan and Andersen-Broadie bounds with 1000 trials in the nested simulation ($13.65 and $13.58, respectively) are better than the perfect information bound with our simple delta penalty ($13.67), the Haugh-Kogan and Andersen-Broadie bounds were very time-consuming to compute with this many nested trials. However, even with 1000 nested trials, the Haugh-Kogan and Andersen-Broadie bounds were not as tight as the imperfect information bound with our simple delta penalty ($13.52). Thus, here the imperfect information relaxation provides tighter bounds with this relatively easy-to-compute penalty.
Conclusions
We believe that the dual approach developed in this paper provides a powerful, general, and flexible approach for calculating upper bounds in DPs. In applications, the researcher can control the computational effort and the quality of the bound by choosing the penalties, information relaxations and/or the number of simulations run. As discussed in the introduction, we see this dual approach as complementing approximate dynamic programming and the use of simulation methods with heuristic policies: given some candidate policy, we can use simulation to determine the value with this policy and use our dual approach to generate an upper bound on the value of an optimal policy. The gap between the lower and upper bounds gives an indication of how much better we could do with a more complex policy. In practice, we may find that we can identify policies that are "good enough" with relatively little work. We demonstrated these dual bounds in two complex applications (adaptive inventory control and option pricing) that are of significant practical interest and the results appear to be promising. Lai, Margot, and Secomandi (2008) recently applied this dual approach to evaluate heuristic policies used to manage a natural gas storage facility.
There is certainly an element of art in selecting penalties and information relaxations, just as there is art in selecting good heuristic policies and in selecting approximate value functions in approximate dynamic programming. The choice of information relaxation is particularly important as it determines which uncertainties are treated as stochastic in the inner problem and which are treated as deterministic. For instance in the option pricing example, it is straightforward to model stock price uncertainty with known but time-varying volatility and interest rates, but difficult to treat volatility, interest rates and stock prices all as stochastic. In the adaptive inventory control problem, it is hard to consider the full tree of possible demand histories but relatively easy to sample from this large tree. As discussed in §2.3, the key is to select a penalty that approximately cancels the benefit provided by the additional information. However, we must be mindful of the computational effort required to compute these penalties. In our examples, we considered simple penalties that were derived from the heuristic policy and were easy to compute.
There are a number of directions for possible future research on these dual methods. First, it would be interesting to consider continuous-time and/or infinite-horizon models as well as the discrete-time, finitehorizon DP models considered here. Second, we would like to study ways to optimize the dual bound through the use of a parameterized family of penalty functions. For example, we might allow the penalty function to be a weighted combination of candidate penalties and then optimize the weights when estimating the bound. More ambitiously, we might attempt to develop automatic methods for generating feasible (i.e., nonanticipative) policies or improvements on given policies using the results from the dual optimization problems. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we need to build more experience through applying these techniques in examples. In so doing, we can perhaps develop a better understanding of what kinds of penalties and relaxations work well for what kinds of problems.
Notes
1 Note that we assume that the set of possible action sequences does not depend on the outcome ω and also that the probabilities associated with the outcomes do not depend on the selected actions. We could allow the set of possible action sequences to depend on ω by restricting the set of policies to some subset of A. The general formulation of the DP (1) would be unchanged but the recursive formulation (2) would need to be modified to allow the actions available in each period to depend (in a measurable way) on the outcome ω. Problems with action-dependent probabilities can often be recast as equivalent problems with action-independent probabilities, sometimes quite naturally. For example, we could think of the inventory example of §3 as having random transitions from one inventory level to the next inventory level; the transition probabilities would then depend on the actions (the order quantities). Alternatively, we can formulate this problem (as we will) with demand as uncertain and independent of the actions. For a general problem, one could take the outcome ω to be a series (U 0 , . . . , U T ) of uniform random numbers where Ut revealed in period t; we could then calculate the period-t state from these random deviates and the chosen actions (a 0 , . . . , a t−1 ). There are a variety of ways one can reformulate a model to have action-independent probabilities and in applications we would want to exploit the specific structure of the problem under consideration.
2 Note that it is possible for the estimated duality gap to be negative: although our penalties have zero expected penalty for nonanticipative policies, there is no guarantee that these penalties will have exactly zero expected penalty in a particular sample. When we saw negative gaps in our study, the estimated gaps were small compared to the associated standard errors.
3 All computations were performed using MATLAB on a Dell PC (with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Quad CPU and 3.25 GB of RAM) running Microsoft Windows XP. Proof. By weak duality, the right side of (7) is greater than or equal to the left side. To establish strong duality, we need to show that if the left side is bounded, there exists a z * that obtains equality. Let z * (a) = r(a) − v * where v * is the optimal value of the primal DP (1). To see that this z is dual feasible, note that for
With this penalty, the penalized objective r(a) − z(a) is equal to v * for all a and hence, for any policy α (including those in
This implies that z * achieves equality in (7). If the primal problem is unbounded, by weak duality, the dual problem must also be unbounded.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof. We first consider sufficiency. Consider any α * F ∈ A F and z * ∈ Z F and suppose (8) holds and
Then we can rewrite the dual problem with this penalty as
. Then, by weak duality, α * F and z * must be optimal. To show necessity, first note that for any α * F ∈ A F and z * ∈ Z F , we have:
If α * F ∈ A F and z * ∈ Z F are primal and dual optimal (respectively), then by the strong duality theorem, the first and last terms above are equal, so the intervening inequalities must hold with equality and we have E [z * (α Note that this result need not hold for policies that are not G-adapted: In z G t (α G ), the policy α G selects actions a for a given ω and z G t (α G ) takes on the corresponding value of E [w t (a)|G t ]. That is, we calculate the "G-average" in the conditional expectation first and then select averaged values. In E [w t (α G )|G t ] we select values w t (a) according to the policy α G first and then calculate the averages in the conditional expectations. In these terms, the lemma says that if α G is G-adapted, G-averaging then selecting is equivalent to selecting then G-averaging.
Proof. Consider a G-adapted policy α G and pick an ω 0 in Ω and let a 0 = α G (ω 0 ). Define H 0 as the set of ω such that the first t+1 actions in a match those of a 0 ; note that ω 0 is in
The first equality follows from the definition of z 
Here we first use the definition of the conditional expectations and then use the fact that, under α G , all ω in H 0 select the same actions (a 0 , . . . , a t ) as a 0 . Thus for H ∈ G t such that H ⊆ H 0 , we have
We now show (25) is sufficient to ensure that z
where f is strictly positive; that is the subset of H 0 where z
Then from (25), we know that H + f dP = 0, which (because f > 0 on H + ) implies that H + has measure 0 (see, e.g., Billingsley 1986 p. 466). We can similarly define a set H − where f < 0 and conclude that H − has measure 0. Thus, we can conclude that f = 0 or z 
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. (i) We can write
Here the first equality follows from Lemma A.1 and the second from the "law of iterated expectations" (see e.g., Billingsley 1986, p. 470) since F t ⊆ G t . Then, using (26) and Lemma A.1 again, we have
This establishes the first part of claim (i). Applying the law of iterated expectations then implies Proof. The fact that z is dual feasible follows from Proposition 2.2 and the fact that it is optimal for the dual problem follows from the inductive argument in the text preceding the statement of the theorem. The fact that any α * F ∈ A F that is optimal for the primal problem is also optimal for the dual problem then follows by the complementary slackness result, Theorem 2.2.
To establish the last part of the theorem, let us abuse notation a bit and write V t (a) in place of V t (a 0 , . . . , a t ) with the understanding that subsequence of actions (a 0 , . . . , a t ) is selected from the full sequence of actions a. If α * F ∈ A F is optimal for the primal problem, we then have
The first equality is simply the definition of r and z and the second equality follows from Lemma A.1 (using the fact that α * F ∈ A F ). The final equality follows from the definition of V t , i.e., we have
(almost everywhere); note this equality may fail on a set of measure zero for an optimal policy α * 
The first equality follows from the definition of the penalty z 1 and Lemma A.1. The inequality follows from the fact that A G 1 ⊆ A G 2 when G 2 is a relaxation of G 1 . The next equality follows from the fact that
which we will establish shortly. The final equality follows from the definition of the penalty z 2 and Lemma A.1. To see that E E w t (α G )|G 
≤ sup
Rearranging this yields the inequality on the right in (13). Interchanging z 1 and z 2 and multiplying through by −1 yields the inequality on the left in (13).
(iii) The proof here follows the proof of Proposition 2.2, except we now take z
for any F-adapted α F . This can be established as follows:
Here the first equality follows from Lemma A.1 (since α F being F-adapted implies α F is also F -adapted) and the second equality follows from the law of iterated expectations since F t ⊆ G t . The rest of the proof then proceeds as in the proof of Proposition 2.2.
(iv) Suppose α * G ∈ A G is an optimal solution for the left side of (14). Then we have
The first inequality follows from the fact that α * G ∈ AĜ (since G ⊆Ĝ). The next two equalities follow from the definition ofẑ and the law of iterated expectations, respectively. The third equality follows from the estimate being unbiased and Lemma A.1: the estimate being unbiased means z t (a) = E [ẑ t (a)|G t ] and, since α *
The fourth equality follows from the definition of z and the final equality follows from the definition of α * G as an optimal solution for the left side of (14). If there is no α * G that attains the optimal value (i.e., the supremum is approached but not attained), for any > 0 we can find an α * G ∈ A G that is within of the optimal value. The argument above goes through for this α * G except the last line becomes
Because can be made arbitrarily small, the desired result still holds.
A.7. Imperfect Information Bounds for the Adaptive Inventory Example
As noted in §3. 4 , in this case, we would generate demandsd k t and the corresponding distributionsπ k t in the kth trial of the outer simulation. The inner dual problem is then a stochastic DP that explicitly considers the uncertainty about the ordering costs: the lower-bound cost-to-go function J L,k t (x t , c t ) in the kth trial can be written recursively as
with the terminal value J L,k
A.8. Derivation of Equation (22) Using Ito's lemma and equation (19), we can write the diffusion equation for S τ = ln(s τ ) as
Using a discrete-time approximation of this diffusion equation with time steps of length δ and taking G t to represent the state of information where all interest rates and volatilities are known, S t+1 is normally distributed with mean and variance:
The stock price s t = exp(S t ) is then log-normally distributed with mean
Equation (22) then follows by substituting the expressions above for the mean and variance of S t+1 .
A.9. Comparison of Option Pricing Bounds with Haugh and Kogan (2004)
As noted in the text, with the perfect information relaxation the "flattened" version of the inner problem for the option pricing example (see equation (24) 
where h t is the option payoff function. Including the µ 0 term here allows the use of martingales with nonzero initial values, but this is not a substantive difference in formulations: We could always replace µ t with µ t − µ 0 in (34) and have the same bound but with µ 0 = 0. Alternatively, we could add µ 0 to (33). The subtle difference centers on the definition of the option payoff function h t and how non-exercise is handled. Haugh and Kogan and others require h t to be a non-negative function that describes the payoffs of the option if exercised in period t. For a call option, they take h t = max{0, (s t − K)}. There is a small abuse of terminology here: we do not "exercise" an option to get a 0 payoff. We could, however, perhaps throw away or "burn" an option. The possibility of burning an option before expiration doesn't matter in the primal problem, because we would never burn an option before it expires.
However, the possibility of burning an option may matter in the dual. Compare the maximization problems in (33) and (34) in the case of a call option. Problem (34) allows the DM to burn the call option before expiration in period t (t < T ) and receive −µ t or exercise the option and receive φ t (s t − K) − µ t . In (33), the DM can receive φ t (s t − K) − µ t , but cannot receive −µ t alone. In other words, for a call option, we have
and it could be the case that the inequality is strict for some µ t . Thus the two formulations (33) and (34) are slightly different, with (33) providing tighter bounds.
B. Comparison with Stochastic Programming Duality Results
As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of relaxing the nonanticipativity constraints has been exploited in the stochastic programming (SP) literature. In the SP literature, the nonanticipativity constraints discussed in our paper are sometimes called "implementability" constraints. Here we briefly review this SP formulation and compare it to ours. We also briefly compare our formulation to that of Rogers (2007).
B.1. Stochastic Programming Duality
Our description of the SP approach follows Shapiro and Ruszczynski (2007, pp. 55-75; hereafter SR) and follows them in focusing on perfect information relaxations. The first main assumption is to assume the actions a t are scalars or, more generally, vectors in R n . Let α t (ω) denote the action selected in period t by policy α with outcome ω. The nonanticipativity constraints require the DM to select the same period-t action in all outcomes that are indistinguishable at time t. We can write these constraints as α t = E [α t |F t ], so the selected action, viewed as a random variable, is equal to its own expected value conditional on the time-t state of information.
SR then place some assumptions on the reward functions and action spaces and use standard Lagrange duality arguments to "dualize" the nonanticipativity constraint. First, assume the reward functions (r 0 (a, ω) , . . . , r T (a, ω)) depend on the action selected in period t but are independent of the actions selected in other periods. Second, assume that each r t (a, ω) is polyhedral (piecewise linear and convex) in a t for all ω. Third, assume the sequences of actions a = (a 0 , . . . , a T ) are drawn from a A ⊆ R n(T +1) defined by a set of linear constraints. Now, let λ t be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the nonanticipativity constraints requiring α t = E [α t |F t ]. Since α t is a random variable, λ t is also a random variable (i.e., a function of ω) and has the same dimensionality as α t . SR then show that the Lagrangian dual of the stochastic program can be written as
Standard Lagrange duality arguments ensure that weak and strong duality hold in this framework. In (36), the λ t α t term in the objective function can be viewed as analogous to a linear penalty. The constraint E [λ t |F t ] = 0 is equivalent to requiring E [α t λ t |F t ] = 0 for all nonanticipative α t , which is analogous to our definition of dual feasible penalties (3), albeit with an equality constraint in place of the inequality. The optimization in (36) is no longer constrained by the nonanticipativity constraint and is analogous to the inner problem for the perfect information relaxation in equation (5) above. This allows us to decompose the inner problem into a series of scenario-specific subproblems for a given set of Lagrange multipliers.
Our formulation of the primal DP problem (1) is more general than the SP formulation in that we do not place any restrictions on the action spaces or reward functions and, in the dual, we do not require the penalties to be linear functions of the actions; weak and strong duality hold without these assumptions. As formulated, our examples do not fit within the SP formulation. The option pricing example has a discrete action space. The inventory model has integer constraints on the order quantities and, if even if we ignore these integer constraints, the penalties we considered in the inventory example are not linear functions of the actions and hence are not consistent with the SP formulation.
B.2. Linear Programming Formulation of DP Duality
As discussed in §2.2, there are strong connections between our results and standard results in linear programming. In fact, if we allow the use of mixed policies, then our formulation of the primal DP can be viewed as a linear programming problem where the decision variables are mixing probabilities on policies; the objective function and constraints are both linear functions of the mixing probabilities. Applying Lagrange duality arguments like those used in the SP framework in our linear programming formulation of the primal delivers results and penalties like ours. However, as shown in §2.2, we can also use simple, direct arguments to establish the duality results. In this subsection, we describe this linear programming formulation and duality argument. For ease of exposition, we will assume that the set of outcomes Ω and actions sequences A are finite sets and, hence, the set of all policies A is finite as well, with |A| = |Ω| |A| . In our "mixed" version of the primal problem (1), rather than selecting a policy α that selects an action sequence a in given outcome ω (i.e., α : Ω → A), we instead randomly choose a policy α ∈ A using a probability measure µ. A mixed policy µ is nonanticipative if its mass is concentrated on the set of nonanticipative policies A F . Let M and M F be the set of all mixed policies and all nonanticipative mixed policies, respectively. Clearly M is a convex set with extreme points corresponding to degenerate distributions that place all of their mass on a single policy α. Similarly, M F is a convex set with extreme points corresponding to degenerate distributions that place all of their mass on a single nonanticipative policy α.
The mixed version of the original primal (1) can be written as
where ρ(ω) = (r(α(ω), ω)) α∈A is a random vector describing the rewards for each policy α. (Note ρ : Ω → R |A| .) The inner product µ ρ is a random variable (a function of ω) that represents the expected rewards associated with the mixed policy µ, with the expectations taken over the mixture of policies, not the outcomes ω. Note the objective function is linear in µ and the constraint set M F is convex in µ; thus the optimal value will be attained at an extreme point of M F . As noted above, the extreme points of M F correspond to the degenerate mixed policies that place all of their mass on a single nonanticipative policy α. Thus the optimal value for the mixed primal (37) will match that of the original primal (1) and each optimal solution for the mixed primal will correspond to a nonanticipative policy that is optimal for the original problem or perhaps a mixture of nonanticipative policies, each of which is optimal for the original problem.
Next we develop a linear equality based representation of the nonanticipativity constraint. First note that we can define nonanticipativity for non-mixed policies using an indicator function 1 a0,. 
Note that both sides of (38) are random variables and the equality constraints must hold for every ω. We now generalize this idea to mixed policies. Let µ t (a 0 , . . . , a t ; ω) denote the probability of choosing the action (sub)sequence (a 0 , . . . , a t ) given outcome ω and mixed policy µ. This probability µ t (a 0 , . . . , a t ; ω) can be calculated as the inner product µ 1 a 0 ,...,a t (ω) where 1 a 0 ,...,a t (ω) = (1 a 0 ,...,a t (α(ω))) α∈A . Here 1 a 0 ,...,a t (ω) is a random vector with entries noting whether policy α matches the specified action subsequence for the given outcome ω. (Note 1 a0,. ..,at : Ω → {0, 1} |A| .) Suppressing the outcome ω, we can view µ t (a 0 , . . . , a t ) = µ 1 a0,...,at as a random variable. Using this, we can write a linear constraint that requires the probability of choosing an action sequence (a 0 , . . . , a t ) under µ to be F t -measurable: µ t (a 0 , . . . , a t ) = E [µ t (a 0 , . . . , a t )|F t ] for all t and (a 0 , . . . , a t ).
If this condition is satisfied, we can build a "decision tree" to describe the expected payoffs of the problem with well-defined probabilities for each decision node that are conditioned on the period-t state of information F t and the prior history of actions. The conditional probabilities for period-t are given by µ t (a 0 , . . . , a t )/µ t−1 (a 0 , . . . , a t−1 ) and (39) ensures that these conditional probabilities are measurable with respect to F t , so that they depend only on the outcomes of uncertainties that have already been resolved (e.g., on chance nodes that appear before the decisions in the decision tree).
We can now consider an alternative version of the mixed primal (37) with the linear constraint (39) replacing the nonanticipativity constraint (µ ∈ M F ): 
It is straightforward to show that any nonanticipative mixture satisfies (39): the nonanticipative mixtures assign positive probability only to policies that satisfy (38) and thus the nonanticipative mixtures must satisfy (39). The constraint (39) may also be satisfied by mixed policies µ that are not nonanticipative, so (40) is a relaxation of (37). However, for any mixed policy µ satisfying (39), we can construct a nonanticipative mixed policy that is "behaviorally equivalent" to µ in that it leads to the same joint probability distribution on action sequences and outcomes (A × Ω) and thus leads to the same expected rewards; this follows from a famous result in game theory known as Kuhn's Theorem (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
2 Given this, replacing the nonanticipativity constraint in (37) with the relaxed constraint (39) does not improve the optimal value and we can construct a behaviorally equivalent nonanticipative mixed policy corresponding to any solution to (40).
Having established that the original primal (1) and linear mixed primal (40) have equal optimal values and corresponding solutions, we now proceed to consider the Lagrangian dual of the mixed primal (40) by relaxing the constraints forcing the mixed policies µ to satisfy the linear constraints (39). The dual function can be written
The Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (39) are given by a stochastic process w t (ω) ∈ R 
Any dual feasible z t , that is, any z t satisfying E [z t |F t ] = 0 (or any set of generating functions w t that depend on the first t-periods actions and ω) will generate an upper bound on the mixed primal problem (40) and hence the original primal (1). Strong Lagrangian duality implies that there exists a z t such that the bounds are tight.
Recalling that µ t = µ 1 a 0 ,...,a t , we see that this Lagrangian is linear in µ and obtains the maximum in (42) at an extreme point of M which concentrates all of its mass at a single policy α in A. Thus (42) can be written as 
With no constraints on the policy chosen, we can decompose this into a series of outcome-specific optimization problems where we choose the action a for each ω and rewrite (43) as 
Thus, for any dual feasible penalty (z 0 , . . . , z T ) (or Lagrange multipliers/generating functions (w 0 , . . . , w T )), (44) generates an upper bound on the original primal (1) and there exist a penalty/generating function that leads to a tight upper bound. This is exactly the perfect information bound given in equation (5) above.
B.3. Relationship to Rogers (2007)
Rogers (2007) recently independently proposed an extension of his dual approach to option pricing (Rogers 2002) to Markov decision processes. He considers only the perfect information relaxations and assumes the DP has a Markovian structure with a period-t state variable X t that, in our notation, can be viewed as a function of ω and the action vector a. Rogers considers period-t "penalties" of the form E [h t+1 (X t+1 )|F t ] − h t+1 (X t+1 ). These penalties are similar to those generated by our Proposition 2.2 except his generating functions h t depend on the state X t alone whereas our generating functions w t can depend on both the outcome ω and actions a. Rogers shows that weak and strong duality holds with penalties of this form; strong duality is established by taking h t (X t ) to be the dynamic programming value function. Rogers provides some ideas and results towards constructing an algorithm for approximately solving a Markov decision problem, but does not consider any specific applications of the approach or numerical examples. Our approach is more general than Rogers in that we do not require the DP to have a Markov structure, we consider imperfect as well as perfect information relaxations, we consider a larger class of penalties, and we present many additional results (e.g., complementary slackness, properties of penalties and relaxations) and some specific examples.
C. Further Details on the Adaptive Inventory Example
This appendix provides the detailed assumptions for the inventory example that were omitted from the main body of the paper. The seven different state transition matrices are described in Table 5 and the four different prior distributions are shown in Table 6 . Figure 2 shows the transition probabilities for the Markov chain for the ordering costs c t . Figure 3 shows the lower bounds generated by using the perfect information relaxation with the zero-, one-and two-period look-ahead penalties. The format is the same as the "aquarium plot" of Figure 1 . Tables 7 and 8 provide the values and mean standard errors underlying Figure 1 and Figure 3 . Table 9 provides the results for the modified myopic policy discussed in §3.6. 
